The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a valuable study entitled “Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond the Muslim Brotherhood,” prepared by Marc Lynch, a scholar specializing in the politics of the Arab world. The study argues that Arab Islamist parties are facing genuine challenges. After decades of confrontation and conflict with authoritarian regimes, they are now required to engage in politics within entirely new local, regional, and intra-Islamist contexts. Yet despite the dramatic collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, other Islamist movements have managed to pragmatically restructure their organizations, ideologies, and strategies in ways that have enabled them to adapt to changing circumstances, confounding observers and defying expectations. These parties have participated actively in elections in their countries and have engaged in serious debates over important issues such as leadership, ideology, and strategy. This, the study argues, requires viewing them “not merely as ideological actors, but as rational political movements responding to the distinctive political opportunities and challenges present in each of their countries.” On this basis, the study maintains that Islamist parties will continue to play an important role in the politics of most Arab countries despite the pressures they have faced in recent years. These parties have positioned themselves as centrist movements, providing citizens with Islamist orientations an opportunity to participate in nonviolent mainstream political life. They succeed by defending this centrist position rather than drifting toward extremist positions that would ultimately marginalize them. Because Islamist parties tend to adapt to the political environments in which they operate, political regimes should provide opportunities for their continued participation in formal politics instead of pushing them toward clandestine activity or violent resistance. These parties had achieved electoral victories in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, and played major roles in Western-supported political coalitions formed in Syria and Yemen. However, these initial successes quickly suffered setbacks. Tunisia’s Ennahda Party stepped down from power in January 2014 amid political unrest, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt through parliamentary and presidential elections triggered an intense backlash. Within nine months of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president, most sectors of the Egyptian political class had come together under the National Salvation Front, established in December 2012 with the specific objective of removing him from power. With the support of the military, they ultimately succeeded. These setbacks imposed a new environment on Islamist parties. Most now operate in unfamiliar circumstances characterized by new forms of state repression, social polarization, organizational difficulties, regional rivalries, international hostility, and competition within Islamist movements themselves. Although the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has often been interpreted as evidence of a broader pathology affecting Islamist parties, subsequent developments do not support the assumption that Islamists are inherently incapable of participating in democratic politics. Not all Islamist parties face bleak prospects. Some, particularly outside Egypt, have discovered new opportunities to advance their political agendas. It has become increasingly clear that the political context, rather than inherent characteristics of ideology, is the primary determinant of a movement’s activities and orientation. Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party, explicitly emphasized this point in an interview conducted by Marc Lynch in August 2016. Lynch therefore concludes that pragmatism and caution, rather than ideology or revolutionary enthusiasm, are likely to remain the guiding principles of major Islamist political parties so long as political systems continue to provide them with opportunities for participation. The study emphasizes that it would be far too early to write off Islamist parties and organizations. Their deep social roots and remarkable resilience, even under exceptionally repressive regimes, suggest that they will continue to play a decisive role in regional politics, just as they have for decades. But why? According to the study, several fundamental characteristics distinguished the political presence of movements derived from the Muslim Brotherhood during the decades preceding the Arab uprisings. These included a clear organizational hierarchy and tightly structured institutions, a strong and visible public presence, the adoption of a moderate ideology, participation in elections whenever opportunities arose, and a commitment to nonviolence. This commitment helped reassure Western governments and provided the movements with a degree of protection from state repression. Although they supported major regional causes such as Palestine, they generally prioritized domestic political objectives over transnational commitments. Lynch considers these characteristics to have represented important sources of strength for the movement. With regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, however, almost all of these defining characteristics disappeared after the military coup. The organization no longer possesses a strong public presence in society or extensive social-service networks. Its internal organization now faces opposition from within, while some members have begun questioning its commitment to nonviolence. Its fragmented leadership has become less capable of exercising control over the organization, and the Brotherhood is no longer able to participate in electoral competition in Egypt. In other countries, Islamist organizations have responded differently to these new challenges. Some have retained the institutional structures and political strategies developed before the 2011 uprisings, while others have abandoned or modified some of their central characteristics in an effort to preserve their political and social positions. The choices made by Islamist groups have also varied. Some survived repression and chose to return to political life, while others moved toward forms of post-Islamist politics. The political environment that emerged in Egypt after the coup, however, went far beyond state repression. The polarization that divided public opinion over Islamism undermined the Brotherhood’s carefully cultivated political positioning. It became increasingly difficult for the movement to occupy the political center because, in effect, the center itself had largely disappeared. Moreover, the profound sense of injustice felt by many Brotherhood members as a result of the coup and the repression that followed weakened the normative value of remaining in the political center. What appeared to be a major shift in Egyptian public opinion against the Brotherhood also quickly dismantled much of what the organization had spent decades building and raised deeper strategic and political questions. It was probably this Egyptian experience that pushed Tunisia’s Ennahda Party toward a more cautious position based on reducing the importance of ideology in favor of broader inclusion. Morocco’s Justice and Development Party likewise took several steps toward accommodation after the Egyptian coup, including surrendering key ministries to parties aligned with the political establishment. The Egyptian coup had devastating consequences for the strategy of democratic inclusion. At the same time, the Syrian civil war strengthened extremist sectarian Salafi and Salafi-jihadist tendencies at the expense of the Muslim Brotherhood’s traditional cautious pragmatism. In comparison with today’s complex landscape, the war on terrorism against al-Qaeda following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States appeared relatively straightforward and predictable. In recent years, however, the region has witnessed not only the rise of jihadist groups and the suppression of democratic aspirations, but also the emergence of new, highly destructive forms of sectarian and mass mobilization. Instead of positioning itself as the strong embodiment of a successful mainstream current within Islamist politics, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly finds itself competing with more radical Islamist rivals from an ineffective and politically weakened moderate position. Lynch argues that the current regional environment, particularly developments in Egypt, now appears likely to push Islamist parties away from the paths of participation and nonviolence. The willingness of some young Islamists to embrace armed resistance, he suggests, is precisely what might be expected in the aftermath of the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre and the sweeping campaign of repression that followed. Political scientists studying Islamist movements have long debated whether Muslim Brotherhood organizations become more moderate when given the opportunity to participate in democratic politics. Much of this debate, however, has produced inconclusive results. The regional and Islamist landscape has changed so dramatically in recent years that it now appears increasingly unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood can continue to act as a barrier against violent extremist organizations, even if it still wishes to do so. More likely, the growing violence of national and regional politics, combined with the retreat of democratic and peaceful alternatives, will push Muslim Brotherhood political thinking in more radical directions. The shock of the 2013 coup had a profound impact on many younger members of the organization. Nonviolence as a political strategy consequently came to appear unsuccessful, while actors employing violence seemed to be making gains across the region. It is difficult to defend nonviolence while peaceful Islamists themselves are subjected to repression. In a concluding section entitled “What Is the Future of Islamist Politics?”, the study argues that the difficulties faced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt do not signal the end of Islamism. Islamist movements have survived severe campaigns of state repression in the past. Despite decades of harassment against Tunisia’s Ennahda movement, it won elections less than a year after the overthrow of former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria survived the Assad regime’s campaign against it, which came closer to eradication than ordinary repression, and later played prominent roles in opposition institutions that emerged after the 2011 uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt also survived the intense repression imposed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime during the 1950s and 1960s. It therefore appears possible that the Brotherhood may eventually recover from its current crisis, although it will likely re-emerge in a significantly different form. Lynch argues that Islamists have cautiously begun debating these new political realities and reconsidering their ideologies and strategies. These discussions, many of which take place relatively openly on websites and social media platforms, provide a glimpse into the collective efforts of Islamists to understand and adapt to current circumstances. They have not yet, however, made substantial progress toward developing a new consensus. The hardships endured by members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 left deep and bitter scars, while the effects of internal divisions continue to reverberate. For Moroccan and Tunisian Islamists, as well as many others, the demands of domestic politics have largely occupied their attention. In conflict zones such as Libya and Syria, the conditions of war and the appeal of more radical ideologies have created formidable obstacles that are difficult to overcome. Despite the depth of Lynch’s research, it is clear that the study ultimately reaches conclusions that are already broadly familiar: repression generates a sense of injustice, injustice in turn generates a desire for revenge, while expanding freedoms, guaranteeing the right to open political activity, providing opportunities for expression, allowing organized political participation, promoting values of tolerance, and respecting the right to disagreement are among the fundamental guarantees of a political system capable of achieving security and stability and protecting societies from conflict, violence, and polarization. Lynch was therefore right to argue that political regimes should provide opportunities for Islamist parties to continue participating in formal politics rather than forcing them into clandestine activity or violent resistance. The question, then, is which path Arab and Islamic political leaders will choose: the uncertain prospects that may await Islamist movements if repression and restrictions continue, or the deliberate strategies that encourage Islamist movements to engage in peaceful political activity based on tolerance and national consensus?