Democratic Transition in Sudan: Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects Dr. Bahaeldin Makkawi Mohammed Gaily Department of International Affairs, Qatar University, Qatar. Abstract The Sudanese transitional government that came to power after the fall of the Al-Bashir regime faces numerous challenges related to the nature of its composition, the ongoing conflicts among its various components, deteriorating economic conditions, continuous external interference in Sudan’s affairs, and difficulties in sustaining peace. On the other hand, it has several opportunities, including the broad popular base on which it relies, in addition to international and regional support. The future of democratic transition in Sudan depends on the transitional government’s ability to benefit from these opportunities, overcome difficulties, and address the challenges it faces. Keywords: Transitional Government, Armed Forces, Forces of Freedom and Change, Peace, Transitional Justice. Abstract The Sudanese transitional government, which came to power after the fall of Al- Bashir regime, faces many challenges related to the nature of its composition and the ongoing conflicts between its parties, the poor economic conditions, the continuous external interference in Sudan’s affairs, and the difficulties of sustaining peace. On the other hand, it has many opportunities, including a broad popular base, in addition to international and regional support. The future of the democratic transition in Sudan depends on the ability of the transitional government to take advantage of the opportunities, and its ability to overcome difficulties and face the challenges. Key words: Transitional government Armed Forces, Forces of Freedom and Change, Peace, Transitional Justice. Introduction: After thirty years of military rule in Sudan (1989–2019), the revolution that began on December 13, 2018, succeeded in overthrowing the regime of President Omar Al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, marking the beginning of a new phase in Sudan’s political history. Since gaining independence on January 1, 1956, Sudan has experienced three democratic periods, three military coups, and four transitional periods. The era of national governance began with a short democratic experience that lasted less than three years, after which the military, led by Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud, seized power on November 17, 1958, and ruled the country for six years. However, a widespread popular uprising overthrew his regime in October 1964 and restored democratic rule, which became known as the Second Democracy. On May 25, 1969, the army once again seized power under the leadership of Colonel (then) Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri, who ruled the country for sixteen years. The Sudanese people launched another uprising, removing the second military regime on April 6, 1985. The fall of the Nimeiri regime was followed by the Third Democratic Period, which lasted for about three years before the military, for the third time, overthrew the elected democratic government led by Brigadier (then) Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir on June 30, 1989. Al-Bashir remained in power for thirty years until the Sudanese people rose against his rule and succeeded in removing him from power on April 11, 2019. Despite the multiple transitional governments that Sudan has experienced, the current transitional phase is different in all respects compared with previous transitional periods in modern Sudanese history. The current transitional government faces more complex circumstances than all previous transitional periods due to several factors, including the composition of the government itself, the ongoing conflicts among its various components, the nature of the tasks it seeks to achieve, the fragile economic, social, and security conditions inherited from the Al-Bashir regime, as well as extensive regional and international interventions in Sudanese affairs. Based on the above, the main question of this paper is: To what extent is the transitional government capable of confronting the challenges of democratic transition and utilizing the available opportunities to lead Sudan toward the desired stage of democratic transformation? This main question is accompanied by several sub-questions: What is meant by democratic transition? What challenges face the process of democratic transition in Sudan? What opportunities does the current transitional government have to overcome these challenges? And what are the prospects and future of democratic transition in Sudan in light of these challenges and opportunities? Objectives and Significance of the Paper: This paper aims to shed light on the challenges facing the Sudanese transitional government and the opportunities available to it, with the aim of contributing to the development of a roadmap that enables the country to address the serious challenges confronting democratic transition and to utilize the available opportunities to strengthen the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. The significance of this paper stems from its attempt to contribute to solving a problem related to the future of governance in Sudan. Failure to achieve the objectives of the transitional period and establish democratic rule could undermine political stability in the country due to the intense ethnic conflicts that exist throughout all parts of Sudan without exception. Therefore, the importance of this paper lies in its effort to provide a scientific vision that contributes to the desired democratic transformation and helps protect the country from conflicts and civil war. Research Methodology and Proposed Approaches: The study is based on the democratic transition approach. Due to the nature of the topic, the researcher employs a number of methodologies, including the historical method, which is used to examine historical events and understand their impact on the course of political and social developments in Sudan. The study also uses the comparative method by comparing the current transitional experience with previous transitional periods in Sudan, as well as with other regional and international transition experiences. In addition, the researcher applies the analytical method to investigate the challenges facing democratic transition in Sudan and the opportunities available for its success. Furthermore, the study adopts a prospective approach to identify hidden challenges that may emerge from the complex realities in Sudan, the nature of the interconnected relationships among its political, military, and security forces, and the extensive regional interventions in its internal affairs. Structure of the Study: The research has been divided into an introduction, three sections, and a conclusion, as follows: Section One: The Theoretical Framework of the Study Section Two: Challenges and Opportunities of Democratic Transition in Sudan Section Three: Prospects and Future of Democratic Transition in Sudan First: The Theoretical Framework of the Study Addressing this topic requires a discussion of the concept of democratic transition and distinguishing it from related terms such as democratic transformation and democratic consolidation. It also requires examining the causes of the transition to democracy, the opportunities and challenges of democratic transition, as well as the role of economic, social, and cultural development in the success of democratic transition. In addition, it involves exploring the role of civil society in accelerating and strengthening the democratic transition process. Before engaging with the literature on democratic transformation and the various schools of thought in this field, it is necessary to begin with the linguistic definition of transition. In Lisan al-Arab by Ibn Manzur, it is stated that: “Transfer means moving something from one place to another; he transferred it, transfers it, and thus it was moved. Movement from one place to another is transformation” (Ibn Manzur, n.d.: 4529). It is also stated that tahawwal means moving from one place to another, and transformation refers to movement from one position to another. The noun form is huwal, as mentioned in the verse: “They will abide therein forever and will not seek any change from it” (previous source, 1056). Thus, it becomes clear that there is a linguistic similarity between transition and transformation. However, from a terminological perspective, scholars distinguish between democratic transition and democratic transformation. They argue that democratic transition necessarily precedes the process of democratic transformation, and that the transition to democratic governance consists of three basic stages, as follows:^:

1. The stage of the decline of the old regime and the emergence of a reformist faction from within it or an external opposition calling for political reform.
2. The stage in which the ruling regime begins to implement reforms through the adoption of certain opening-up measures.
3. The stage of the actual transition to democracy and the pursuit of establishing and consolidating its rules and institutions (Al-Boushi, 2018: 9).

According to Abdel-Fattah Mady, there are several approaches to democratic transition, including: the transition directly from colonial rule to national democratic governance, as in the cases of India and Malaysia; gradual transition from authoritarian rule to democracy; reform from above led by reformists from within the regime itself; transition resulting from the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democratic systems in their place; and transition through external intervention, either through diplomatic and intelligence pressures or through direct military intervention (Mady, 2015: 17–21). Some scholars argue that democratic transformation has occurred and continues to occur throughout the world through one of three methods. It may come from above, when the regime itself seeks to implement reforms. In this case, the "soft-line" faction within the ruling authority begins calling for greater tolerance of press freedom, opposition to arbitrary imprisonment, and the introduction of some formal democratic procedures, such as calling for elections with limited participation or allowing the establishment of civil society organizations and other measures (Schmitter). Transformation may also occur from the bottom upward, as happened in Venezuela following the intensification of internal pressures on the political system, which led to the end of the regime, opened the way for liberal democracy, and resulted in the establishment of an elected government. A similar process occurred in Sudan during the October 1964 and April 1985 uprisings. Transformation may also occur through the convergence of interests between the ruling authority and opposition forces, when both sides recognize the importance of moving toward a new political framework. This occurred in South Africa due to the convergence of interests between white and black capitalists, particularly in their efforts to pressure the apartheid government to remove restrictions on black labor because capitalism needed this workforce. In addition, international and regional pressures on both sides compelled them to agree on the goal of democratic transformation based on equality between whites and blacks. Following democratic transition and democratic transformation comes the stage of democratic consolidation, which refers to the achievement of democracy and the deepening of democratic mechanisms and culture within society (Rustow, 1970: 361). Despite the existence of waves of transitions toward democracy, these democratic waves are usually confronted by counter-waves, which sometimes lead to widespread democratic reversals (Huntington, 1991). Some thinkers also argue that the growth and consolidation of democracy within society is largely linked to the prevailing political culture. For example, Almond and Verba believe that democracy requires the existence of a value system that protects it, supports its development, and contributes to strengthening broad political participation by citizens (Almond and Verba, 1965). Others argue that there is a direct relationship between economic conditions and democratic consolidation; the more improved a country’s economic conditions are, the more democratic and politically stable it tends to become (Lipset, 1959). On the other hand, some scholars emphasize the role of elites in stabilizing democratic systems. They argue that elite unity usually leads to a stable democratic system, while divided national elites lead to political instability and open the door for external forces to interfere in the country’s internal affairs, possibly providing them with a favorable opportunity to overthrow the existing political system (Higley and Burton, 1988).^. Some thinkers have emphasized the pivotal role of civil society in achieving democracy and consolidating its institutions. They have argued that strong civil societies are characterized by broader networks of interaction among individuals within society and by greater acceptance of personal freedom and individual rights. A strong civil society provides greater opportunities for democracy to succeed, endure over the long term, and withstand challenges. Likewise, the application of democratic principles strengthens civil society and creates the conditions necessary for its success (Whitehead, 2002).^. Some thinkers have concluded that obstacles to democratic transition include the existence of political ambitions within the military, a state apparatus opposed to democratic transition, the disappointment of high public expectations, disorder, and uncontrolled competition. They also argue that the strategic importance of a state increases the likelihood of external factors obstructing the transition. Conversely, the democratic culture of ruling elites, their flexibility and willingness to negotiate and reach compromises, their commitment to democracy, and their ability to overcome internal disagreements represent decisive factors during the stage of democratic transition (Bishara, 2020: 558).^.. Second: Challenges of Democratic Transition in Sudan: The fall of the regime of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir and the country’s entry into a new transitional phase ^([1]) The fall of the regime does not necessarily mean achieving the desired democratic transformation. The Arab uprisings of 2011, for example, witnessed setbacks and reversals, and the process of democratic transition failed completely in several countries that experienced widespread popular movements aimed at overthrowing ruling regimes and establishing democratic systems. Although peoples succeeded in removing authoritarian regimes in some countries, they were unable to complete the democratic transition process, as occurred in Libya and Yemen. Meanwhile, popular movements failed to overthrow some ruling regimes despite the determination of opposition forces, as in Syria, due to Russian support for the regime. Some Arab thinkers have described these cases, in which revolutions remained incomplete, as representing “disappointments” for the revolutionaries (Belqziz, 2012). Azmi Bishara also addressed cases of democratic reversal that occurred in the Arab world, such as Syria, which “was transformed, due to the regime’s rigidity, its rejection of reform, its brutal methods in confronting the peaceful popular movement, the opposition’s lack of experience, and the armed movements’ slide into religious extremism, into a civil war with countless foreign interventions” (Abu Shouk, 2021:18). In reality, the transitional government in Sudan faces a number of challenges that may threaten to undermine the entire democratic transition process. In the following pages, the researcher will address the most important challenges facing democratic transition in Sudan. Challenges of Democratic Transformation in Sudan:

1. The Nature of the Transitional Government’s Composition and the Ongoing Disputes Among Its Components:

The researcher believes that the composition of the current transitional government represents the greatest obstacle to democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days following the fall of the regime, a dispute emerged between civilians and the military over the role of each side in the revolution and the political entitlements resulting from it. Civilians emphasize the civilian nature of the revolution, arguing that it succeeded because of the pressure exerted by political forces against the regime throughout thirty years, which continuously weakened it until its fall in April. They also argue that the young people who remained in the protest squares for months and sacrificed their lives for democracy and freedom were the decisive factor in achieving change. On the other hand, the military argues that the army was the decisive element in the change process, and that its intervention prevented further bloodshed. They also maintain that the coming period requires the presence of the army in the Sudanese political scene due to the fragile security conditions in various parts of the country and within the capital. Some political analysts believe that the roots of this dilemma go back to the moment when the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) directed...^([2]) The protesters gathered in front of the General Command of the Armed Forces and called on the army leadership to side with the street. Those who hold this view argue that believing the army could remove the Salvation regime and then return to its barracks was merely a form of wishful thinking (Wishful Thinking) (Sayed Ahmed, January 4, 2021). However, in reality, civilians had few alternatives. The revolutionaries were unable to achieve a complete and decisive victory over the regime, which forced them to turn to the General Command and call upon the army to resolve the situation. Yet, this step gave the armed forces the opportunity to settle the matter in favor of the protesters and subsequently demand participation in power. In this regard, Azmi Bishara states: “We have the right to ‘suspect’ that choosing the General Command as the location for the sit-in involved a bet on the army to help the revolution get rid of Al-Bashir […] It should be assumed that Sudanese political parties understood that the army in Sudan was difficult to neutralize, and convincing it to overthrow Al-Bashir was more difficult than neutralizing it […] The regime in Sudan could not have fallen as long as the army remained loyal to its president” (Abu Shouk, 2021: 25). During the formation of the transitional government, disagreements emerged between the two sides over several issues. The most prominent areas of dispute included the authority over security institutions, the immunity of members of the Sovereignty Council, the affiliation of the Ministry of Justice, and the distribution ratios of members of the Legislative Council.^([3])During the negotiations, the disagreement between the two sides became clear when Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Military Council, announced on May 15, 2019, the suspension of negotiations with the Forces of Freedom and Change for 72 hours. He justified this decision by claiming that they were provoking the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces and blocking roads. He also stipulated that, in order to resume negotiations, the Forces of Freedom and Change must remove barricades, reopen roads and bridges, and stop escalating media criticism against the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, May 16, 2019). The deadlock reached between the two sides was the reason behind the establishment of barricades and the provocations by some youth elements toward the army and the Rapid Support Forces. Al-Burhan’s decision aimed to confirm that the army held the initiative, directed events, and had the ability to suspend and resume negotiations according to its own conditions. However, the prolonged negotiations and the increasing intensity of disagreements, accompanied by widespread public concerns, forced both sides to accept African mediation, through which they reached a political agreement on July 16, 2019. In this agreement, both parties committed to dealing “on the basis of partnership, good faith, and refraining from hostile and provocative rhetoric […] and resolving all disputes that may arise through dialogue and mutual respect” (Al Jazeera Net, July 17, 2019). This agreement was followed by a period of relative consensus that allowed the signing of the Constitutional Document on August 17, 2019, more than four months after the fall of the regime. During this period, the situation within the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition was not better than its relationship with the military component. Differences emerged among the components of the Forces of Freedom and Change after the fall of the regime. This was not unexpected for several reasons. The Forces of Freedom and Change was a broad alliance established at the beginning of 2019 during the protests against Al-Bashir’s regime. It included parties and groups with diverse political views and positions. The overthrow of the regime was the primary goal and the unified element that created a broad umbrella under which all these political forces gathered. However, the fall of the regime itself led to the disappearance of the unifying factor among these groups. It also created new political opportunities and economic gains that resulted in intense conflicts among former allies. Indeed, conflict and competition became the defining feature of relations among these forces. Disagreements within the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition continued to escalate. One result was the announcement by the Umma Party on April 22, 2020, that it was freezing its activities in all structures of the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, arguing that “fundamental shortcomings had emerged in the performance of transitional governance tasks […] including confusion in the positions of the political leadership of the Forces of Freedom and Change, disagreements over the jurisdictions of transitional institutions, and violations of the Constitutional Document upon which all arrangements of the transitional period were based” (Adel Abdel Rahim, Anadolu Agency).^. This was followed by the withdrawal of the Sudanese Professionals Association from the coalition. In a statement published on its Facebook page, the association explained that its withdrawal was due to the failure to adhere to the objectives of the transitional period, the confusion in the coalition’s performance, the prioritization by the Forces of Freedom and Change of narrow interests and tactical considerations over major strategic interests, and the weak commitment to the declared objectives of the transitional period (SdnProAssociation, July 25, 2020). Later, in November 2020, the Sudanese Communist Party announced its withdrawal from the Forces of Freedom and Change. In its withdrawal statement, the party stated: “After more than a year […] our country is still facing the same crises, while the transitional authority continues to reduce the space of freedoms and violate rights in an attempt to stop the revolutionary momentum, emptying the slogan ‘Freedom, Peace, and Justice’ of its content, and confiscating the tools of change represented by the Legislative Council, local popular governance, commissions, and others. It is also delaying the achievement of justice, retribution for the martyrs, investigations into the dispersal of the sit-in, and the trial of figures from the former regime, while maintaining laws restricting freedoms and concluding agreements and alliances behind the backs of our people” (Al-Sudani Newspaper, November 7, 2020).^. If we take into consideration what John Higley and Michael emphasized regarding the role of political elite unity in the existence of a stable democratic system, and how a divided national elite leads to an unstable political system, we would recognize the need for political elite consensus during the transitional period in order to achieve the objectives of the revolution. The conflict between the military and civilian components, as well as the disagreements among the civilian forces operating under the umbrella of the Forces of Freedom and Change, have wasted a significant amount of time and effort. The current challenge is to compensate for the time lost from the transitional period by intensifying efforts and moving forward in accomplishing the tasks of the transitional phase within the remaining time.

2. The Multiplicity of Transitional Period Tasks and the Delay in Completing Transitional Institutions:

The tasks of previous transitional periods were generally limited to conducting population censuses, distributing electoral constituencies, holding elections, and then transferring power to leaders elected by the people. However, the current transitional government undertook additional tasks that it considered essential for sustaining democracy in Sudan. According to statements by the former Minister of Culture and the government’s official spokesperson at the time, Mr. Faisal Mohamed Saleh, the current transitional government identified ten priorities at its first meeting: achieving sustainable peace and ending the war; addressing the economic crisis, particularly rising prices; forming an independent committee to investigate the events surrounding the dispersal of the sit-in; strengthening the role of women; reforming state institutions; defining the relationship between the central government and state governments; establishing a foreign policy that considers Sudan’s interests; improving services such as health, education, social welfare, and the environment; preparing for the constitutional conference; and combating corruption (Sputnik Arabic, 2019). It is self-evident that the multiplicity and complexity of the transitional government’s tasks necessarily require effective institutions capable of carrying out these responsibilities. However, the paradox is that despite undertaking tasks that many considered beyond its mandate and authority, the government failed to establish the institutions responsible for implementing these tasks. Disputes between the civilian and military components, as well as disagreements within the Forces of Freedom and Change, delayed the completion of the transitional authority structures, which in turn affected the overall performance of the transitional government. The Constitutional Document stipulated the institutions of the transitional period. In addition to the main transitional governing bodies, namely the Sovereignty Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Transitional Legislative Council, the document provided for the establishment of several political structures that would enable the government to accomplish the tasks of the transitional period. The most important of these are the so-called independent commissions, including the Peace Commission, the Borders Commission, the Constitution-Making and Constitutional Conference Commission, and the Elections Commission, which are formed by the Sovereignty Council. The document also provided for commissions to be established by the Council of Ministers, including the Legal Reform Commission, the Anti-Corruption and Public Funds Recovery Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Civil Service Reform Commission, the Land Commission, the Transitional Justice Commission, the Women and Gender Equality Commission, and any other commissions that the Council of Ministers considers necessary to establish (Republic of Sudan, Constitutional Document, 2019: Chapter 12). ^. More than two years have passed since the fall of the regime at the time of writing, and many structures of the transitional period have still not been completed. Among the institutions and structures stipulated in the Constitutional Document that have not yet been established are: the Transitional Justice Commission, the Elections Commission, and the Legislative Council. There is no doubt that delaying the completion of the transitional structures would affect the overall performance of the transitional government. If we consider that one of the most important functions of the transitional period is to deal with the legacy of previous regimes, which requires accelerating the establishment of the Transitional Justice Commission, and preparing the conditions for democratic elections, which requires the formation of the Elections Commission—and that these two commissions have not yet been established—we would recognize the clear shortcomings in the performance of the transitional authority and in its prioritization of tasks. One of the most important reasons that hindered the establishment of transitional structures was the conflict among the parties involved in the political process over positions. Despite repeated calls for the formation of a technocratic government composed of qualified individuals, the selection of political office holders was based on power-sharing among allied political forces. Negotiations over this issue consumed much time and effort that could have been directed toward implementing the tasks of the transitional period if the government had been selected on the basis of competence and clear criteria had been established for assuming positions. In addition, the transitional government chose to postpone the formation of some political institutions, such as the Legislative Council and others, until an agreement could be reached with armed struggle movements. However, as expected, achieving peace was not an easy matter. Negotiations between the two sides continued for more than a year, during which many institutions were not established, causing the transitional government’s efforts on many urgent and critical issues to stagnate. Even after the signing of peace agreements, the ruling parties did not demonstrate the necessary seriousness in establishing important state structures, such as the Legislative Council. ^([4]) .

3. Weakness of Political Parties and Civil Society Organizations:

Political parties have become an urgent political necessity in any democratic society. Lipset argues that political parties are “indispensable for democracy” (Lipset, 2000: 48, 55). They represent the spearhead during the democratic transition phase. However, Sudanese political parties suffer from continuous weakness and decline due to the shrinking of their popular bases, weak or lost funding, the absence of political succession mechanisms, and the weakness and outdated nature of party programs. The history of the emergence of Sudanese political parties dates back to the mid-1940s. ^([5])At that time, the two major parties (the National Unionist Party and the Umma Party) alternated between positions of government and opposition, or governed through coalition arrangements throughout Sudan’s democratic periods. Alongside the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party, these two parties played active roles in overthrowing military governments and restoring democracy on several occasions. However, Sudan’s political reality has witnessed fundamental changes regarding the status of the historical parties. These parties have been unable to attract young people to their ranks and consequently have failed to maintain their previous position in terms of popular support. The former military regime contributed to weakening these parties by deliberately dividing them and encouraging conflicts among their leaders. This resulted in widespread splits within these parties, including the Umma Party, which fragmented into several parties, as well as the Democratic Unionist Party and the Communist Party. The division even reached the ruling party itself at the end of the 1990s. Dr. Abdel Rahim Bilal states that the Salvation regime, in order to remain in power, “built party institutions and alliances (alignment parties, national unity parties, dialogue parties, fragmentation of independent parties such as the Umma and Unionist parties, construction of institutions supporting the regime, and domestication of unions and civil organizations)” (Al-Batahani, 2019:9). Party divisions, the long absence of these parties from power, the decline of historical leaders due to illness or death, and the lack of leaders with similar strength and charisma have contributed to the decline of the role of these political parties. Furthermore, the emergence of armed movements in eastern, western, and northern Sudan weakened political parties, as many supporters of these parties joined these movements, while others joined the ruling party at the time, abandoning their historical parties. When the ruling military regime fell, the political arena was largely empty of any effective party with a broad popular base. The National Congress Party disappeared after the fall of the regime and its subsequent banning, while other political parties were unable to fill the vacuum due to the previously mentioned factors. As a result, the military and armed movements expanded to fill the space left by the collapse of Al-Bashir’s regime. The clearest evidence of the lack of basic sources of strength among political parties is the marginalization they currently experience and their almost complete absence from the political scene, which has been dominated by the Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and armed movements on one side, with limited participation by some party forces such as the Umma Party, which allied with the ruling forces, and the Communist Party, which opposes the transitional government’s policies. Because the ruling forces during the transitional period lacked the popular bases that would enable them to gain power through elections, they resorted to extending the transitional period to four years and later extended it again during negotiations with armed struggle movements. Although holding elections is one of the most important tasks of the transitional government, it has not given this issue sufficient attention, as evidenced by the fact that it had not established the new Elections Commission at the time of writing. This suggests that holding elections does not represent a priority for the new rulers and does not serve their political objectives. Despite the long history of Sudanese political parties, most of them remain unable to perform their required political role. Clearly, these parties have not developed either in terms of their intellectual visions and political programs or their organizational structures. A number of criteria are used to measure the effectiveness of political parties, including organizational structure, popular support bases, programs, leadership, political succession mechanisms within the party, and sources of funding (Makawi, Effectiveness of Parties, 2018:10–24). Applying these criteria to Sudanese parties reveals that most suffer from fundamental problems, such as weak organizational structures, absence of programs, lack of internal democracy and political succession mechanisms, and funding difficulties. Generally, the situation within these parties is not moving toward improvement, which does not encourage optimism about their future or reliance on their effective role in the ongoing democratic transition process. All indicators point to their decline and the deepening of their crises (Makawi, Manarij Al-Lawa, 2018:119–126). There is no doubt that weak political parties directly affect the country’s political structure. Therefore, reforming Sudanese political parties is the primary gateway to strengthening and developing the political system. In reality, Sudanese parties need to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of changes in the political environment and accordingly develop their programs, plans, structures, and methods. They should study the experiences of political parties in other countries and benefit from them whenever useful. They should also work specifically to attract more young people and women into their ranks, as they represent the vital force in the political environment during this critical stage of Sudanese history. Additionally, they should seek to develop broad-based political action and expanded party alliances based on common interests. In this regard, Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Shouk and Salah Al-Din Al-Zein argue that these parties need “to practice institutional self-criticism in order to consolidate commitment to democratic values in managing their internal conflicts […] and to review horizontal party relations […] which should be based on agreements regarding policies and supreme national interests” (Abu Shouk and Al-Zein, 2020:27). Civil society organizations also suffer from significant weakness due to the practices of the previous regime and its persistent efforts to control and restrict these organizations. Civil society has been heavily politicized, leading to divisions within many of its organizations. In addition, most civil society organizations in Sudan suffer from limited funding sources, as well as political and ethnic conflicts within them. Therefore, with the exception of the decisive role played by the Sudanese Professionals Association in igniting the revolution, a large sector of civil society has been and continues to be largely absent from the political scene. As Whitehead emphasized, the existence of a strong civil society provides a greater opportunity for democracy to succeed, endure, and face challenges. Activating civil society requires coordination among its organizations, providing the necessary funding for its activities, and defining its relationship with political parties. There is no doubt that the weakness of Sudanese political parties and civil society organizations negatively affects democratic transition. Therefore, the challenge facing the transitional government in this regard is its ability to form an effective political bloc of political parties and civil forces capable of filling the clear vacuum left after the fall of the regime.

4. Economic deterioration andHigh Cost of Living:

Deteriorating economic conditions are among the most significant obstacles facing political systems during the transition toward democracy. As Roberto Stefan Foa expressed, “securing a broad coalition for democratic reform becomes more difficult with the poor economic performance of established and transitional democracies” (Tarek Masoud, The Arab Spring). In Sudan, the deterioration of economic conditions was the primary cause of the Sudanese revolution that erupted on December 19, 2018, and led to the fall of the regime on April 11, 2019. The masses in several Sudanese cities protested against the rising prices of basic commodities, the decline in the value of the Sudanese currency, and the shortage or absence of many goods in markets. This was in addition to the scarcity of cash and citizens’ inability to access their bank savings to meet their basic needs. After the fall of the regime, economic conditions did not improve as the revolutionary masses had expected. On the contrary, economic deterioration increased, and Sudanese citizens continued to suffer from the high cost of living and shortages of essential commodities such as bread and fuel. The inflation rate rose to more than 378%, the national currency deteriorated to the point that one US dollar equaled 375 Sudanese pounds (in March 2021), and Sudan’s debt reached 201% of gross domestic product (British Broadcasting Corporation, December 17, 2020). The Sudanese Ministry of Finance identified general policies for the 2021 budget, among the most important of which were addressing all forms of tax evasion, rationalizing tax exemptions, and directing bank financing toward productive sectors. The budget policy also emphasized the necessity of placing all public funds under the authority of the Ministry of Finance and reviewing laws that contradict this principle. It also stressed that the Ministry of Finance’s authority should include all institutions, including companies belonging to the armed forces (Ali, 2021). Dr. Abdalla Hamdok called, during a press conference, for the Sudanese army to hand over its companies to the government and transform them into “public shareholding companies.” He stated that the army’s investment in military manufacturing is acceptable and practiced in many countries, but that its investment in civilian production is unacceptable. In response to Hamdok’s call, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan stated that “the army’s companies have not monopolized exports,” emphasizing that the army was not responsible for the economic failures facing the country (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 2020).^. The economic deterioration and poor living conditions in Sudan led citizens to take part in widespread demonstrations across the capital and major Sudanese cities, demanding the resignation of Dr. Abdalla Hamdok’s government. The Sudanese Professionals Association, the coalition that led the protests against former President Omar Al-Bashir, participated in these demonstrations. The association called for protests against the worsening economic conditions under the transitional government. In a statement, the association stated: “The transitional authority has completed a year since its formation, and crises are increasing alarmingly every day. Government performance is confused and weak and does not rise to the expectations of the great December Revolution… The hardship of living is no longer bearable, and our people spend their days struggling to obtain the basics of their needs, including bread and fuel” (France24, 2020). The legitimacy of the ruling authority began to erode due to its failure to address the high cost of living, especially given that public expectations were extremely high. The transitional government did not explain the situation with complete transparency. The revolutionary atmosphere was still present, and the aspirations of the young revolutionaries had no limits. However, the transitional government followed this powerful revolutionary momentum and did not want to lose the support of these young people. It was not sufficiently transparent with the public. For example, the Prime Minister had promised not to resort to lifting subsidies on goods. In a statement immediately after the formation of the government (in August 2019), Dr. Abdalla Hamdok announced that he would adopt a local “formula” that would take into account the difficult living conditions facing citizens and encourage international financial institutions to provide assistance without imposing conditions (Fadl, 2019). However, three months later, Dr. Hamdok announced that he was preparing to conduct broad dialogues and discussions with sectors of society regarding the removal of state subsidies on basic commodities, allowing the people to decide whether to accept or reject this measure (Yassin, 2019). In this context, Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs at the United Nations, stated before the Security Council that international support for Sudan was extremely important as the country continued on the path of democratic transition. She explained that the COVID-19 pandemic and floods had increased the budget deficit by approximately 250 million dollars per month (United Nations, 2020).^، The International Crisis Group called on donors to provide urgent assistance or risk the collapse of the transitional government (Creta, 2020). The economic crisis affected the relationship between the two sides of the authority: the military and civilian components, who publicly exchanged accusations. While civilians accused the military of controlling most of the country’s economic resources, the military emphasized that the economic crisis was caused by the weakness of the civilian government headed by Hamdok and its inability to address the economic crisis.

5. Achieving Peace:

Article Eight of the Constitutional Document, which addresses the tasks of the transitional period, stipulated “working to achieve just and comprehensive peace and ending the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem and dealing with its consequences.” On October 3, 2020, the transitional government signed an agreement with the armed movements affiliated with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The most prominent movements that signed the agreement included the Justice and Equality Movement led by Dr. Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Army Movement – Minni Minnawi faction, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North – Malik Agar faction, in addition to the Eastern and Northern tracks. Later, the transitional government began negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu, which refused to sign the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020. The transitional government also failed to reach an agreement with the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nour up to the time of writing. The peace agreement signed between the two sides, which included eight protocols, addressed several issues, including transitional justice and compensation, land ownership, development of the pastoral and grazing sectors, wealth and power sharing, and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The agreement granted the Sudan Revolutionary Front three seats in the Transitional Sovereignty Council, in addition to five ministerial positions and seventy-five seats in the Transitional Parliament. It also stipulated the integration of armed movements into the Sudanese army and granted them 20% of civil service positions. The agreement exempted movement leaders from Article 20 of the Constitutional Document, which prohibits anyone who has held a position in the transitional authority from running in future elections (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, October 4, 2020). There is no doubt that reaching a peace agreement to end the war, which left deep humanitarian, economic, and social consequences, represented significant progress toward Sudanese national unity. However, achieving the desired peace faces many challenges. The most prominent challenges facing the peace process include: A. Delay in establishing the structures of the new authority stipulated in the peace agreement: The peace agreement provided for the formation of a new transitional government, the restructuring of the Sovereignty Council, the appointment of new governors in the regions, and efforts to integrate fighters into the Sudanese army. However, most of these provisions were not implemented according to the timelines agreed upon in the agreement’s implementation matrix. Sher Abu Nammu, head of the negotiating delegation of the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi, stated: “We have now spent more than three months, and unfortunately, things have not moved from their place.” Abu Nammu believes that this is due to “complex disputes between the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, the signatory parties, and the military component” (Nawai, 2020).^. B. The deteriorating economic conditions and the continuous decline of the Sudanese currency, reflected in the inflation rate that reached 250% at the beginning of 2021, along with the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, made it difficult to implement the commitments included in the peace agreement. C. The issue of achieving peace is closely linked to transitional justice and addressing the legacy of the previous regime. However, accusations against some current leaders of involvement in violations that occurred in conflict areas make it difficult to achieve this objective. The agreement stipulated the beginning of the process of integrating and disarming forces 60 days after its signing. However, the lack of financial resources required for the integration process prevented its implementation within the timeframe specified in the agreement. In an attempt by the movements that signed the peace agreements to create a fait accompli, forces belonging to some of these movements arrived in Khartoum with their full military equipment. An armed group took control of the building of the “Olympic Committee,” and a crisis was almost triggered after the group was asked to leave the site. The armed displays in the streets of Khartoum, which coincided with signs of insecurity, raised citizens’ concerns. Fears also increased of a possible military confrontation between members of one of these groups inside the capital, Khartoum. However, the police were able to contain the situation. In his first periodic briefing to the United Nations Security Council, Volker Perthes, Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), warned of the risks resulting from the existence of multiple armies in Sudan. He emphasized that peace cannot be achieved under such fragile security conditions. Observers point out that there are at least five armies operating in the streets of Khartoum (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, Issue 15454).

6. Achieving Transitional Justice:

According to the United Nations definition, transitional justice encompasses “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with society’s efforts to understand its legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, establish justice, and achieve reconciliation. It includes […] the prosecution of individuals, compensation, fact-finding, constitutional reform, and vetting personal records to uncover abuses” (Benyoub, 2012).^. The International Center for Transitional Justice defines it as “a set of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented by different countries to address the legacy of serious human rights violations inherited from the past. These measures include prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various forms of institutional reform” (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2020). In general, transitional justice aims to achieve the following objectives:^:

1. Revealing the truth and providing a comprehensive historical account of what happened.
2. Acknowledging the mistakes that were committed.
3. Identifying those responsible and holding accountability for the violations and abuses that occurred.
4. Achieving reconciliation.
5. Ensuring the non-recurrence of human rights violations, including guarantees provided through institutional reform.
6. Restoring trust in state institutions.
7. Strengthening the rule of law.
8. Providing compensation to victims (Benyoub, previous reference, p. 9).

The period of the third military government, which lasted for thirty years (1989–2019), witnessed widespread human rights violations. This period saw bloody wars that affected South Sudan, Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and some areas in the north. These wars resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, and local populations were forced to leave their villages and seek refuge in displacement camps that lacked the most basic necessities of life, including food, medicine, and personal security, leading to further loss of lives. Prisons and detention centers also witnessed unprecedented cases of torture, known as the “ghost houses.” Protesters were subjected to mass killings, as occurred during the revolution, in addition to the large number of young people killed in the massacre of the sit-in dispersal at the General Command, the disappearance of hundreds of citizens, and thousands of injuries. Human rights were significantly violated during Al-Bashir’s rule, during the days of the revolution, and afterward. This requires accelerating and seriously implementing transitional justice measures to uncover the truth, hold those responsible for violations accountable, ensure the non-recurrence of abuses, and achieve comprehensive social reconciliation. Recognizing the serious violations that occurred during the period of the Salvation regime, all parties included clear provisions on transitional justice in the Constitutional Document, which stated the following:

1. The transitional authority is committed to enforcing the rule of law, applying the principle of accountability, and restoring grievances and usurped rights.
2. The state institutions during the transitional period are committed to holding members of the former regime accountable for all crimes committed against the Sudanese people since June 30, 1989, in accordance with the law.
3. Dismantling the empowerment structure of the June 30, 1989 regime and building a state based on the rule of law and institutions.
4. Establishing a national investigation committee […] to conduct a transparent and thorough investigation into the violations that occurred on June 3, 2019.
5. Establishing the Transitional Justice Commission.
6. Beginning the implementation of transitional justice measures and accountability for crimes against humanity and war crimes, and referring the accused to national and international courts in accordance with the principle of combating impunity.

The issue of transitional justice has been emphasized in several provisions of the Constitutional Document, which serves as the main guiding framework for the transitional period. However, the implementation of transitional justice principles remains far from being achieved in practice. The most important indicators of this include the following:

1. The Transitional Justice Commission has not been established up to the time of writing, despite the fact that it represents the gateway to a new democratic era that moves beyond the negative aspects of the past and opens a new chapter in Sudanese history. This may be attributed to the delay in drafting the Commission’s law, which took a long time to prepare and still remains a draft that has not yet been approved.
2. A committee was formed to investigate the events of June 3, 2019; however, the committee has not been able to submit its final report up to the time of writing and has requested extensions several times, possibly due to pressures faced by the committee.

In reality, despite the strong popular support calling for the achievement of justice, justice is often not realized. History tells us of the impunity granted to those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity during World War I, the escape of fascists in Italy after the fall of their regime, and the immunity enjoyed by the majority of communist leaders in Eastern Europe after the collapse of their regimes, except in the case of Romania. In Argentina, the military obstructed the military trials established by the government after the transition to civilian rule (Benyoub, previous reference, p. 10). The researcher believes that this is also the position of Abdalla Hamdok’s government, even if it has not openly stated so to the public. The military may not accept the prosecution of its members for the violations committed during years of war in several parts of Sudan, similar to what happened in Argentina in the 1980s, and as occurred in South Africa, where security forces insisted on not continuing negotiations with the Black majority unless they received guarantees that their members would not be prosecuted in the future, and they obtained what they wanted. In reality, one of the challenges facing the implementation of transitional justice is the widespread understanding that limits this justice to the legal aspect only. However, transitional justice includes other dimensions: social aspects (positive discrimination for marginalized groups), financial aspects (compensating victims in a way that enables them to reintegrate into normal life), and psychological aspects (establishing psychological treatment centers for victims of violations in war-affected areas) (Brima, 2019). Transitional justice, contrary to the prevailing view that restricts it to “conducting trials,” includes the establishment of truth commissions, rehabilitation of victims, national reconciliation, and legal, judicial, and political reform (Al-Jazouli, 2019). It is a comprehensive and complex societal process in which the entire society must participate, especially the victims and survivors of “serious” human rights violations whose consequences transitional justice seeks to address (Al-Baqir, 2020). In addition, transitional justice in Sudan faces other challenges, including the lack of sufficient qualified personnel capable of investigating human rights violations and withstanding pressure from those involved, as well as the shortage of financial resources allocated to these tasks. Such tasks require significant funding to obtain the necessary information and data that lead to reaching the facts upon which future judgments can be based. Generally, some argue that “any future transitional justice system in Sudan will face many challenges… including the establishment of courts, in addition to the dilemma of achieving both peace and justice; as trials may push the military to overthrow the democratic process” (Babiker, 2019). Nevertheless, transitional justice remains an urgent demand because it is directly linked to just and sustainable peace, which requires healing the wounds of the past and cleansing society of the effects of physical, material, and psychological violations. There is no doubt that peace itself is essential for sustaining democracy and ensuring that it does not regress in the future. Improving Sudan’s Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Document stipulated “the development of a balanced foreign policy that achieves the supreme interests of the state, works to improve Sudan’s foreign relations, and builds them on the foundations of independence and mutual interests in a manner that preserves the country’s sovereignty, security, and borders” (Constitutional Document for the Transitional Period, 2019: 8.13).^. In reality, the foreign policy file is considered one of the most important issues facing the transitional government. There is almost a consensus among Sudanese politicians and intellectuals that most of Sudan’s problems throughout the previous government’s period resulted from failure in managing this file. The transitional government achieved significant successes in the field of foreign relations, including the removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the provision of a $1.15 billion loan by the United States to repay part of Sudan’s World Bank debts, and the convening of the Berlin Conference, which aimed to “provide economic and political support to the transitional government in Sudan” and pledged $1.8 billion in assistance to Sudan. Nevertheless, the transitional government faces many challenges in the area of foreign relations. Regional and international balances, along with multiple decision-making centers and the complexity of some government actors’ external relations, have created many contradictions in this field. A key component of the transitional government, the Rapid Support Forces, has been linked since the former regime’s era to the Yemen War led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries. Under pressure and incentives from these countries, it seeks to maintain the presence of Sudanese forces there, while the civilian component believes that this contradicts the principle of improving Sudan’s foreign relations and building foreign policy on the basis of independence, as stated in the Constitutional Document. At the same time, an urgent question emerged regarding the authority responsible for managing foreign relations in the transitional government. It became clear that there were multiple centers of foreign policy decision-making within the transitional government. The clearest example was the meeting between Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Entebbe, and the controversy surrounding their reported agreement on normalization between Sudan and Israel. This created a dispute between the military and civilian components, as the civilian side considered Al-Burhan’s action not representative of the government’s position, but rather a personal initiative for which he alone bore responsibility. In reality, there is no clear picture regarding the decision-making center in this critical file. It is evident that the management of foreign relations is shared among different parties. For example, Al-Burhan’s role became prominent in the border issue with Ethiopia, while Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok dominated relations with the United States and the European Union, as well as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam file. Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) played a greater role in relations with Chad and South Sudan, while all three competed over relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Some observers believe that, in many cases, “the share of each partner among Sudan’s ruling partners is determined according to the desire of the external party with interests in dealing with, or avoiding, any particular partner” (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2020).^. Despite the absence of indications that a fundamental dispute may erupt among these parties regarding foreign relations, as the issue has recently taken the form of a kind of division of roles, the complexity of foreign affairs and their interconnectedness with the prolonged transitional period may lead to future disagreements over the management of this important file. Nevertheless, the external dimension should not be overlooked, as foreign interventions play a significant role during stages of democratic transition. International and regional powers often begin to intervene intensively in order to direct developments in ways that serve their interests. Such interventions are usually facilitated by the fragile conditions that generally characterize periods of democratic transition (Snyder, 1998). In this regard, Azmi Bishara argues that foreign interventions could contribute to the failure of democratic transition in Sudan, especially since some regional powers that have been heavily involved in Sudanese affairs since the fall of Al-Bashir’s regime are countries that fundamentally oppose democratic transformation due to their own internal circumstances. Some of these countries also contributed to changing the regime from within in coordination with certain elements of the former system (Abu Shouk, 2021: 20–21). Third: Opportunities and Prospects for Democratic Transformation in Sudan: The failure of the previous regime economically, politically, and security-wise, along with the spread of corruption among the elite controlling political affairs, led to the concentration of power within a small, corrupt, and isolated group. This resulted in the emergence of a reformist current within the National Congress Party that called for addressing existing shortcomings, but it was severely suppressed. Although the regime adopted some reform slogans, its attempts were merely superficial and lacked seriousness, which eventually led to the escalation of popular protests that resulted in the fall of the regime. Therefore, the change occurred from below upward and resulted in the removal of the regime’s symbols. However, Sudan remains far from the desired democratic transformation, and there are fears of a setback in the country’s democratic transition process. There is no doubt that the current transitional period in Sudan represents the most complex phase in the history of modern Sudan due to the heavy legacy inherited by the transitional government from the previous regime. This legacy is reflected in deteriorating economic conditions, the absence of basic requirements for a decent life, and the continuous disappointment of citizens’ expectations; politicized ethnic tensions that have affected all parts of the country; Sudan’s complete international and regional isolation; the clear weakness and almost complete absence of political parties and civil society from the political arena; weak democratic culture among the population in general; and the security instability that has affected large areas of the country, including the capital, Khartoum. At the same time, there are several opportunities available to the transitional government that can contribute to achieving the desired democratic transition in Sudan. The most prominent of these opportunities is the national consensus achieved during the revolution against the previous regime, when all political groups set aside their differences and focused on one goal: overthrowing the regime. At the same time, the success of political and military forces, through joint coordination, in overthrowing the regime strengthened the morale of these forces and convinced them of the importance of unity and national solidarity in order to achieve major objectives. This was the foundation they attempted to build upon during the period following the fall of the regime. Another important opportunity available to the transitional government is the unprecedented external support it received, which was reflected in removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the generous financial support provided by Western countries to the transitional government, and the clear international efforts aimed at cancelling Sudan’s debts. As part of its efforts to expand its political base and compensate for the loss of some allies, the transitional government sought to achieve peace with the armed struggle movements in order to strengthen its popular support base. One leader of the Forces of Freedom and Change expressed this by stating that the government today “is based on a broad political base after the joining of the Revolutionary Front, which includes four armed movements and five political alliances, in addition to the consensus of the political forces operating under the umbrella of the Forces of Freedom and Change, and their recognition of the importance of confronting the challenges of the coming stage” (Ali, 2020).^. However, the success of democratic transition in Sudan depends, to a large extent, on the availability of a political vision that recognizes the risks facing the country, works to expand the base of participation during this critical stage of the nation’s history, and on the ability of the transitional government to positively address all the interconnected and complex issues previously discussed, as well as confront the heavy legacy left by the former regime. To achieve the requirements of a smooth democratic transition, it is necessary to accelerate the completion of the transitional period structures. Delaying the completion of these institutions will lead to the failure of the transitional government in addressing the major tasks it is required to undertake. Considering that the delay in establishing many transitional institutions was justified on the basis of postponing them until after the signing of peace agreements, there is no longer a convincing justification for failing to complete these institutions now, especially since more than six months have passed, at the time of writing, since the signing of the agreement with the armed struggle movements. The leaders of these movements have begun expressing dissatisfaction over the failure to fulfill the requirements of peace, which warns of potential risks resulting from not meeting these obligations. At the same time, it is necessary to address the deteriorating economic conditions. These worsening economic conditions were the primary reason behind the outbreak of the revolution. Instead of improving, however, the situation developed contrary to the expectations of the revolutionaries, as economic conditions deteriorated further and inflation rates increased to unprecedented levels. Although the government is required to bear the costs of peace, it is also required, at the same time, to provide a minimum acceptable standard of living during this stage. This requires a package of urgent economic measures to address the situation, with the government benefiting from opportunities for openness and engagement with the international community. Since national unity in Sudan depends to a large extent on fulfilling the requirements of peace in order to ensure its continuation and prevent further bloodshed among the Sudanese people, this issue must be addressed as quickly as possible to prevent any setback. It is also necessary to provide justice for victims of wars throughout Sudan by implementing the principles of transitional justice, prosecuting human rights violators during the past thirty years, and paying special attention to the issue of the revolution’s martyrs, particularly the dispersal of the sit-in, while bringing those responsible for these crimes to justice. Since international and regional isolation was the main reason behind many of the tragedies Sudan experienced, sufficient attention must be given to this issue and a specific strategy must be developed to advance Sudan’s foreign relations. It is also necessary to unify the center of foreign policy decision-making to prevent contradictions in positions among the ruling forces on the one hand and to ensure the achievement of Sudan’s interests in the desired manner on the other. Before heading to the ballot boxes, efforts must be made to create an appropriate environment for developing political parties and supporting them in this process. Serious work is also required to create the conditions for forming a national bloc capable of achieving the aspirations of the people, ensuring the success of the transitional phase on one hand, and participating effectively in the upcoming elections on the other.Conclusion: After thirty years of military rule, the Sudanese opposition succeeded in ending the rule of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir and establishing a transitional government based on an alliance between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Forces of Freedom and Change. The transitional government was scheduled to continue until elections were held and power was transferred to an elected government in 2024. The transitional government faces a number of challenges, the most important of which include the nature of the government’s composition itself and the lack of trust among its components, which has been evident in many situations. This is in addition to the almost complete absence of national political forces represented by political parties and civil society organizations due to the policies of the previous regime aimed at weakening and dividing them, as well as some foundational and structural problems affecting some of these organizations. Among the profound challenges facing the transitional government in Sudan are addressing economic deterioration and improving living standards, ensuring sustainable peace, achieving transitional justice, and improving Sudan’s foreign relations. At the same time, the transitional government has significant opportunities that, if properly utilized, could contribute to addressing the challenges mentioned above. One of the most important opportunities is the broad popular consensus supporting this government among revolutionaries who opposed the previous regime, are committed to maintaining the democratic system, and seek to prevent any attempt to restore the old regime in any form. This consensus has helped the people endure the economic hardship that has continued to intensify day after day. In addition, the current government has received unprecedented international and regional support due to the hostile policies of the previous regime, international accusations of supporting terrorist movements, and its involvement in a number of terrorist activities, most notably the assassination attempt against the Egyptian president in Ethiopia in 1995. International support for Sudan was demonstrated through the removal of its name from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism, the provision of approximately $1.15 billion in bridge financing by the United States to assist Sudan in paying its arrears to the World Bank, and the Berlin Conference, which sought to provide European economic and political support for Sudan and resulted in an agreement to provide $1.8 billion to support the transitional government in Sudan. The future of democratic transition in Sudan depends on the ability of the transitional government to confront the major and multiple challenges it faces, foremost among them the ability to manage disputes among its components, address the severe living crisis, fulfill the requirements of peace in a way that ensures its continuation and sustainability, and manage foreign relations in a flexible and balanced manner. In this regard, the paper recommends the following:

1. Accelerating the completion of the transitional period structures.
2. Addressing the deteriorating economic conditions by developing emergency plans that serve the interests of citizens and halt the continuous erosion of the legitimacy of the transitional government.
3. Taking urgent measures to provide justice for the victims of the revolution and the wars in different parts of Sudan by implementing the principles of transitional justice and prosecuting human rights violators.
4. Developing a specific strategy to advance Sudan’s foreign relations and unify the center of foreign policy decision-making.
5. Creating an environment conducive to forming a national bloc that can participate effectively in the upcoming elections.

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   [1]    Sudan has witnessed—so far—four transitional periods: the first transitional period (1953–1956), which transferred power from colonial rule to the first national government; the government of Mr. Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa that followed the first military regime; then the government of Dr. Al-Jazouli Dafaa Allah that followed the second military rule; and the government of Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, which came after the third military regime. The Forces of Freedom and Change consist of the Sudanese Professionals Association (a coalition of a group of trade union forces, such as the Democratic Lawyers Alliance, the Sudanese Journalists Network, the Central Doctors Committee, the Sudanese Teachers Committee, and other professional organizations. It was formed secretly in 2013 for security reasons and did not announce itself until August 2018); the Opposition Unionist Gathering (which includes the Unified National Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party – Second Era, the National Unionist Party, the Unified Unionist Party, the Federal Movement, the Free Unionists, the Free Current, and opposition Unionists not affiliated with the mentioned parties); and the Sudan Call Alliance (which includes a number of political parties such as the National Umma Party and some armed movements such as the Revolutionary Front, consisting of: the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Arko Minnawi faction, the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdul Wahid Nur faction, the Justice and Equality Movement led by Jibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North Sector); in addition to the National Consensus Forces (including the Sudanese Communist Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, the Ba’ath Party, and the Nasserist Party); the Civil Forces Bloc, the Republican Party, and the Center Current. [3]  Among the main points of disagreement that necessitated the intervention of the African mediation was the Military Council’s demand that the intelligence service be placed under the authority of the Sovereignty Council and the Defense and Security Committee, while the Forces of Freedom and Change demanded that the service be under the authority of the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers. The Forces of Freedom and Change rejected the Military Council’s demand for full immunity for members of the Sovereignty Council. While the Forces of Freedom and Change demanded that the Public Prosecution be affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister, the Military Council requested that the Public Prosecution remain under the authority of the Sovereignty Council (for more details on this issue, see Sky News, 2020). [4] Perhaps the strangest aspect of the matter is that the Constitutional Document states in Article 4(1) that “The Republic of Sudan is an independent, sovereign, democratic parliamentary state.” How can one speak of a parliamentary republic in a state that has no parliament?!!! [5]  The first political party in Sudan was established in 1944, known as the Ashiqqa Party, led by Ismail Al-Azhari, and it advocated unity with Egypt. Later, after the unification of the parties calling for unity with Egypt, it became known as the National Unionist Party, then the Democratic Unionist Party. In the following year (1945), the independence supporters established the Umma Party, which called for Sudan’s independence from both Egypt and Britain. In the same year, the first communist cell was established in Sudan under the name of the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (HASTO), which later transformed into the Sudanese Communist Party. The late 1940s also witnessed the emergence of the foundation of the Sudanese Islamic movement under the name of the Islamic Liberation Movement in 1949. It later adopted different names, becoming known as the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s, the Islamic Charter Front in the 1960s, the Islamic Front in the 1980s, and the National Congress Party from the 1990s until the fall of Al-Bashir’s regime in 2019. The party, which ruled Sudan for thirty years (1989–2019), was banned after a military coup led by former President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir.